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In recommending the introduction of voluntary administration, the 1988 Harmer Report 
described the reform as ‘worthwhile and a considerable advantage over present procedures if 
it saves or provides better opportunities to salvage even a small percent of the companies 
which, under the present procedures, have no alternative but to be wound up.’1  In keeping 
with the notion of facilitating alternatives for insolvent companies, the Harmer Report 
foreshadowed the notion of an ‘arrangement’ as one of the main features of the proposed 
voluntary administration procedure.2  This was to become the deed of company arrangement 
(‘DOCA’).  The modest ambitions expressed in the Harmer Report appear to be borne out by 
the results currently being delivered by voluntary administrations and DOCAs.  While 
DOCAs appear be something of a limited success, their use and outcomes raise legitimate 
questions as to whether the level of returns currently being achieved for creditors might be 
improved by legislative reform. 
The 2013 Terry Taylor Scholarship project entailed a review of a random sample of 72 
executed DOCAs which were effectuated between 1 August 2012 and 31 July 2013.  This 
review was undertaken with the intention of producing a ‘snapshot’ of current practices and 
trends pertaining to DOCAs – ie, average (or typical) rates of dividends paid, the outcomes or 
goals DOCAs customarily achieve, the profile of the companies executing DOCAs and the 
average duration of DOCAs.  The purpose of this review was to empirically assess the use 
and effectiveness of DOCAs in order to provide a valuable profile of one of the key outcomes 
of the Part 5.3A voluntary administration process and inform the ongoing debate about the 
success or otherwise of Australia’s voluntary administration regime. An empirical review of 
the operation of Part 5.3A of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) (‘the Act’) is timely given that 
Australia’s corporate rescue regime recently marked its 20 year anniversary.    
                                                          
∗ The author sincerely thanks those insolvency practitioners and firms who generously provided data upon 
request.  Without their assistance the author’s research would not have been possible.   
1 ALRC 45 – General Insolvency Inquiry, 1988, Vol 1, Part II (‘Company Insolvency’), Ch 3, 29.  Part 5.3A of 
the Corporations Law (now the Corporations Act) commenced on 23 June 1993. 
2 Ibid, 31. 
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Recent ASIC statistics reveal that while the average annual numbers of both voluntary 
administration appointments and DOCAs have decreased since 2009, DOCA appointments 
have not decreased as markedly as voluntary administration appointments.3  Indeed, the 
proportion of voluntary administrations which convert to DOCAs appears to have increased, 
further reinforcing the important role of DOCAs in Part 5.3A’s operation. 
 
The sample 
A customised report was obtained from ASIC which listed all 350 ‘effectuated’ DOCAs 
between 1 August 2012 and 31 July 2013.  From those 350 DOCAs, 72 DOCAs were 
randomly selected for review (broadly sampled across the 12 month period).4          
The rationale for sampling a recent pool of effectuated DOCAs was to provide a more 
informative and current picture of both how DOCAs are used and their outcomes. A review 
of DOCAs on a ‘start to finish’ basis sheds more light on current trends than would an 
examination of DOCAs which have been more recently executed but remain unimplemented 
(ie, not yet effectuated).  
Data was obtained through a combination of requests of practitioners and the purchase of 
documents from ASIC.   
Sample Review Findings 
Breakdown of DOCA companies by company size 
In terms of distinguishing companies by size, there are various views as to how to define or 
identify a small to medium-sized company (or business).5  For the purposes of this sample 
review of DOCAs, reference was made to s 45A of the Act which requires two of three 
threshold criteria to be met for the definition of a small proprietary company to apply - ie, 
                                                          
3 Statistics sourced from ASIC’s ‘Australian insolvency statistics’ (Series 2) released in May 2014 (available at 
https://www.asic.gov.au/asic/ASIC.NSF/byHeadline/Statistics)  
4 It is understood that a sample of around this size produces respectably ‘robust’ results - ie, a confidence 
interval of 10.31 percent with a 95 percent confidence level.  The author acknowledges the generous assistance 
of Ms River Paul, Statistician with the Australian Financial Security Authority (‘AFSA’) for her valuable input 
on the author’s proposed sampling methodology.  
5 In ASIC’s Report 372 ‘Insolvency statistics: external administrators’ reports (July 2012 to June 2013)’ a 
company’s size is determined by the number of full time equivalent (‘FTE’) employees (p 17).  The report states 
that ‘[i]n 2012-13, 80.8% of reports related to companies with less than 20 employees’. 
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that the company (and any entities it controls) has consolidated revenue of less than $25 
million, consolidated gross assets of less than $12.5 million and fewer than 50 employees.6 
For an alternative yardstick, the sampled DOCAs were also analysed according to the level of 
aggregate, ordinary unsecured, provable debts to which the respective DOCA responded.  
The findings were striking in that 77 percent of DOCAs each addressed total participating 
(ordinary) unsecured claims against their respective DOCA funds of $1.5 million or less.  It 
should be noted that in 87 percent of cases, related-party claims were excluded from 
participating in the DOCA fund.  Therefore, the aggregate ordinary unsecured claims 
participating in the DOCAs usually appeared to represent the body of ‘arms-length’ creditors.   
The profile of the sampled deed administrations in terms of aggregate ordinary unsecured 
debts of the relevant companies is reflected in Chart 1.  
  
Applying one or both of the above criteria – ie, the s 45A thresholds and the unsecured 
participating debts threshold of $1.5 million – 85 percent of the sampled DOCAs appeared to 
relate to ‘small company insolvencies’ at the time of the appointment of voluntary 
administrators.   
                                                          
6 As a comparative reference point, it is worth observing that for the purposes of the small company moratorium 
(CVA) regime in Schedule A1 to the Insolvency Act 1986 (UK) the notion of a ‘small company’ is determined 
by three similar threshold criteria, two of which must also be met to render a company eligible for the regime. 
These three criteria are in turn drawn from s 382(3) of the Companies Act 2006 (UK). 
24 
18 
13 
0 
3 1 2 2 0 
8 
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
Chart 1: Number of DOCAs by  
Aggregate Unsecured Provable 
(Participating) Debts  
(77% ≤ $1.5 million)  
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Weighted average dividend returns from DOCAs 
 
By reference to the final Forms 524 lodged with ASIC in respect of the sampled DOCAs, a 
weighted average dividend return to ordinary unsecured creditors was calculated.   
Across the sampled DOCAs, aggregate dividend payments to ordinary unsecured creditors 
totalled $15,155,664.  Total provable (participating) ordinary unsecured claims in the 
sampled deed administrations amounted to $258,439,932.  This produced a weighted average 
dividend of 5.86 cents in the dollar.7  Five ‘outliers’ were identified and after their exclusion 
the recalculated weighted average dividend was 7.55 cents in the dollar for ordinary 
unsecured creditors (ie, $11,546,118 of aggregate dividend payments against $152,958,600 of 
aggregate participating provable claims).8   
The weighted average/median dividend findings are summarised in Table 1 below.9  
Table 1: Weighted average (and median) dividend returns to ordinary unsecured 
creditors under 71 sampled DOCAs effectuated between 1 August 2012 and 31 July 
2013 
 
 
Weighted Average Dividend 
Including outliers 
 
 
5.86 cents in the dollar (71 DOCAs) 
 
Small Companies 
9.7 c/$ (61 DOCAs) 
 
Large Companies 
4 c/$ (10 DOCAs) 
 
 
Weighted Average Dividend 
Excluding outliers 
 
7.55 cents in the dollar (66 DOCAs) 
 
 
Small Companies 
13.9 c/$ (60 DOCAs) 
 
Large Companies 
3.7 c/$ (6 DOCAs) 
 
 
Median Dividend 
(71 DOCAs) 
 
 
$40,000 (Median dividend payments) 
$733,230 (Median total participating unsecured debts) 
= 
5.4 c/$ median dividend return 
 
 
                                                          
7 This included 12 DOCAs under which no dividend was ultimately paid to ordinary unsecured creditors. 
8 Excluding outliers and all DOCAs under which no dividend was paid to ordinary unsecured creditors (56 
DOCAs), the weighted average dividend to ordinary unsecured creditors was 7.9 cents in the dollar.    
9 One final Form 524 for a ‘creditors’ trust DOCA’ was excluded from the total sample of 72 due to its non-
disclosure of ultimate dividend payments. 
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Section 439A projections versus final dividend returns  
In around 73 percent of cases the sampled DOCAs generated the sort of final return which 
creditors could reasonably have expected on the faith of the projected dividend stated in the s 
439A report (remembering of course that s 439A reports provide informed estimates and do 
not guarantee outcomes).  That is, 73 percent of DOCAs produced a final dividend which 
exceeded, met, or only just (negligibly) fell short of, the projected dividend return set out in 
the preceding s 439A report.   
Of the s 439A reports which projected a DOCA dividend return in comparison with 
liquidation, 77 percent projected a nil return (or the possibility of a nil return) to ordinary 
unsecured creditors in the event of a winding up.  
Costs of voluntary administrations and DOCAs 
Across 41 s 439A reports pertaining to small companies, the average remuneration of the 
administrators - for the period from their appointment to the execution of the subsequent 
DOCA – was $54,670.  The median remuneration for these 41 voluntary administrations was 
$31,500, which may be a more reliable indicator of the level of fees typically charged in a 
small company voluntary administration.  Across 70 final Forms 524 the average 
remuneration of the deed administrators was $97,141 while median remuneration for the deed 
administrations was $28,772 (which again may be a more reliable indicator of the level of 
fees typically charged for the administration of a DOCA).   
Lifespans of DOCAs 
The median duration of the 72 DOCAs sampled - ie, the period between their execution and 
effectuation - was 11.25 months.  (The median duration would probably reflect the more 
typical lifespan of a DOCA.)  The average duration of the sampled DOCAs was 18.2 months.   
Post-DOCA status of the sampled DOCA companies (as at 16 May 2014) 
As can be seen in Table 2 below, most of the companies which entered into the sampled 
DOCAs remain registered with only 21 companies (out of the 72 sampled) either deregistered 
or currently subject to a process of impending deregistration.  The author understands that 
this phenomenon may be attributable to the perceived tax effectiveness of a residual 
corporate shell (including any related party debts which may not have been released or 
extinguished by a DOCA).  However, this matter may warrant further research. 
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Table 2: Post-DOCA Status of Sampled DOCA Companies (as at 16 May 2014) 
Status No. % 
Registered 46 64% 
Deregistered 20 28% 
Strike-off in progress 1 1% 
External Administration 5 7% 
Total 72 100% 
 
Prevalent ‘types’ of DOCAs: Genuine rescues and workouts or pragmatic compromises? 
In short, instances of the preservation or rescue of companies or their businesses in a trading 
sense under a DOCA were in a clear minority (though not negligible).  Of the 68 DOCAs 
substantively reviewed, only 28 percent appeared to involve substantial trading of the 
business through or under the DOCA.  Indeed, in only eight of those instances did the terms 
of the DOCA appear to contemplate a contribution from the trading profits of the business. 
Of the 72 percent of DOCAs which did not entail any substantial trading-on of the business 
through the deed administration, the form of DOCA was invariably a ‘quasi-liquidation’ 
composition, comprising the features or terms set out in Chart 2.  The other 28 percent of 
DOCAs – the ‘creative alternatives’ - provided for companies to substantially trade-on and 
achieve a rescue or continuation of the business in some shape or form for the benefit of both 
creditors and other stakeholders in the business (eg, directors, equity holders and/or 
employees).  The manner of company/business rescue or workout varied among these 
‘creative alternative DOCAs’. 
The profile of the objectives, outcomes and ‘types’ of the 68 sampled DOCAs substantively 
reviewed is set out in Chart 2.  
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Chart 2: Summary of sampled DOCA ‘types’ (objectives/outcomes) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In 73 percent of the ‘quasi-liquidation’ DOCAs there appeared to be negligible company 
assets which would (or could) generate any substantial return for unsecured creditors, let 
TYPE A 
'Quasi-liquidation' DOCA 
49 DOCAs (incl 2 creditors' trusts) 
• Composition by way of compromise; 
• Business usually not traded on 
through/under DOCA (or only very 
limited, 'wind-down' trading); 
• Returns from asset/property 
realisations improved, enhanced or 
augmented by 3rd party contributions  
and/or exclusion of related party 
claims (not otherwise forthcoming in 
liquidation);  
• Liquidation averted in exchange for 
improved or more certain return 
under DOCA; 
• No business rescue;  
• Company may still remain registered;   
• 3.6 cents to 6.6 cents in the dollar 
weighted average dividend return 
(depending on outliers). 
TYPE B 
‘Creative alternative’ DOCA 
19 DOCAs (incl 5 creditors' trusts)  
• Trading-on composition; 
• White-knight investor, purchaser or 
directors make (or guarantee) 
contribution to DOCA fund (or 
creditors’ trust) from which dividend is 
paid for release of unsecured claims, 
facilitating either purchase/restructure 
or clean slate for directors;  
• Alternatively (or in combination), 
some sort of workout for benefit of 
creditors, sometimes DOCA expressly 
providing for contributions to DOCA 
fund from trading profits);  
• Exclusion of related-party claims in 
DOCA fund usually agreed to enhance 
outcome for unsecured creditors; 
• 11.1 to 16.7 cents in the dollar 
weighted average dividend return 
(depending on outliers). 
DOCA Type (68 DOCAs) 
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alone sustain trading.  Indeed, across the entire sample of s 439A reports which were 
obtained, in 73 percent of instances the s 439A report projected a ‘nil return’ to unsecured 
creditors (or a significant possibility thereof) in the event of a winding up.  As reflected in 
Chart 2, the ‘creative alternative DOCAs’ appeared typically to yield a higher ultimate return 
for ordinary unsecured creditors.  It is perhaps self-evident that where a company still has a 
semblance of a trading business to speak of when it enters voluntary administration, the 
administrator and stakeholders have more to work with in procuring a favourable outcome.   
Of course, where a business is rescued and continuity of employment is achieved for workers, 
the ultimate return to unsecured creditors may not necessarily be the sole criterion against 
which to assess the ‘success’ or otherwise of a given DOCA.  The broader economic and 
social implications of corporate or business rescue are relevant considerations but beyond the 
scope of this particular research.        
Other noteworthy observations 
Some other findings from the sample of DOCAs are worthy of specific mention:  
• In 59 out of the 68 DOCAs reviewed (ie, in 87 percent of cases) related parties were 
excluded from participating in the distribution of the DOCA fund, associated 
creditors’ trust or deed administration property;  
• All but one of the DOCAs provided for a full release of creditors’ claims upon 
effectuation of the deed (the one exception was a holding deed which ultimately saw 
the business preserved/rescued and all unsecured creditors paid 100 cents in the 
dollar);  
• Excluding 3 extremely ‘short-term DOCAs’, 75 percent of DOCAs provided for the 
managerial control of the company to revert to the directors upon execution of the 
DOCA. 
Analysis and Conclusions 
Part 5.3A:  A Modest Success? 
There has been a deal of recent (healthy) debate devoted to the question of the ‘success or 
failure’ of the Part 5.3A voluntary administration regime.  It is contended that looking merely 
at the raw numbers of ‘rescued’ businesses and companies against the numbers of companies 
entering external administration is a somewhat simplistic perspective.  As the Harmer Report 
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alluded to, no corporate rescue regime can resuscitate every company in financial distress 
(nor should such a regime aim to do so).  In the author’s view, we should not be aspiring to a 
threshold or quota of corporate or business rescues according to some centrally-planned 
economic policy. (In any event, how is a desirable level of successful corporate rescues in a 
free market economy determined?)  Above all else, Part 5.3A was designed to provide more 
alternatives – ie, a new path or means to better insolvency outcomes which might not have 
been available had the law remained as it stood prior to Part 5.3A’s commencement.   
The outcomes of DOCAs as they are currently being used – at least according to this modest 
sample review – support the conclusion that alternatives more favourable than liquidation are 
being achieved, as was the stated intention of the Harmer Report.  Most of the sampled 
DOCAs improved the ultimate return to unsecured creditors compared with what was likely 
to eventuate in the liquidation scenario.  In a minority, but still significant number of cases 
(28 percent), a DOCA not only improved the bottom line result for creditors, but also 
supporting ongoing trading and the preservation or rescue of the company’s business in some 
shape or form.  The weighted average dividend return to unsecured creditors from the 
sampled DOCAs (5.86 to 7.55 cents in the dollar) is modest, but liquidations which yield no 
return at all for unsecured creditors are legion.  Success is always in the eye of beholder, but 
one can legitimately contend that the goals of the Harmer Report have been (and are still 
being) achieved through Part 5.3A and DOCAs. Whether the voluntary administration regime 
can be further improved is a separate question.      
The ‘one-size fits all’ nature of Part 5.3A: Is a streamlined SME regime worth 
considering? 
The modest weighted average return achieved from the sampled DOCAs begs the question 
whether creditors pay too high a price for the Part 5.3A process (eg, through practitioner 
remuneration and costs).  Are all the features and safeguards of Part 5.3A worthwhile in light 
of the size of companies which commonly utilise a DOCA?  This point is not directed 
towards the charging practices of insolvency practitioners (important though that is) but 
rather the Australian approach of the appointment of independent external administrators who 
are required to have little involvement with the companies of which they and their staff must 
assume control.  The cost of process and independent control may be significant in the 
context of a small company.  Do the modest returns generated by DOCAs justify a rethink of 
whether a ‘debtor in possession’ or more streamlined model might better serve Australian 
small company insolvencies?   
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The small company moratorium procedure introduced in the UK in 2000 is a quasi-debtor-in-
possession procedure, in that the company’s directors maintain managerial control and a 
nominee insolvency practitioner monitors affairs while an arrangement proposal is put to 
creditors.10 However, this procedure has not been widely embraced in the UK, arguably 
because of the prevalence of pre-packaged administrations.  UK directors of SME companies 
who are able to purchase back their business on the first day of a voluntary administration 
have little incentive to explore the prospect of negotiating a ‘workout’ arrangement with 
creditors via the small company statutory moratorium.11  Australia, with its innate resistance 
to pre-packaged administrations, might be more receptive to a small company moratorium 
procedure.   
 
If Australia were to consider the concept of a small company insolvency procedure, some 
reflection would be required as to the appropriate eligibility thresholds, possibly setting them 
lower than the criteria provided in s 45A of the Act.  An aggregate unsecured debt eligibility 
threshold might be considered in framing a small company insolvency regime, along the lines 
of that which currently exists for debt agreements under Part IX of the Bankruptcy Act.  The 
findings of this sample review of DOCAs may suggest $1.5 million of unsecured debts as a 
suitable level at which to set such a threshold. 
   
However, the typical small company voluntary administrator appears to charge only around 
$30,000 in remuneration for the period between appointment and the execution of a DOCA.  
One might query what real value stands to be gained in the way of practitioner-related cost 
savings for small company insolvencies.  Typical administrator remuneration for the 
voluntary administration period equates to around 3 cents in the dollar in dividend terms if 
ordinary participating claims were around $1 million.  Will a streamlined small company 
administration (or moratorium) procedure really provide a dramatic benefit in the way of 
improved returns?  The potential gains from modest cost savings need to be carefully 
balanced against the potential abuse of a new, streamlined SME procedure.   
 
                                                          
10 See Keay & Walton, “Insolvency Law: Corporate and Personal” (3rd ed) 2012, Bristol, Jordan Publishing, 
157 for an outline of the small company moratorium procedure in Schedule A1 to the Insolvency Act 1986 (UK).  
11 See Walters A and Frisby S, 2011, ‘Preliminary Report to the Insolvency Service into Outcomes in Company 
Voluntary Arrangements’, p 17.   
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Promoting early intervention by SME directors: The holy grail of turnaround 
management? 
This sample review of DOCAs observed that in around half of all cases there were very 
limited assets on hand by the time that an administration of the company was in train.  The 
realities of the situations reflected in the s 439A reports and DOCAs suggest that there is 
often little left in the way of a trading business to accommodate any outcome for creditors 
other than a simple composition which ‘beats’ the likely return in a liquidation scenario 
(often zero).  This sample review reinforces the point often made by practitioners that the 
consequences of procrastination by SME directors of distressed companies are just as 
determinative of outcomes as are the nuances of the voluntary administration procedure.12  
No rescue regime can realistically be expected to resuscitate corporate patients already 
deprived of a pulse.       
Closing Comment 
Empirical research is a necessary process in order to properly observe and reflect upon the 
actual outcomes and operation of our insolvency laws.  It is the author’s hope that this modest 
sample review of DOCAs and its findings play a role in providing but one perspective on the 
outcomes and effectiveness of Part 5.3A, thereby making a contribution to the ongoing 
debate as to the calibration of Australia’s corporate rescue laws.  
 
The full version of the report of the findings of the 2013 Terry Taylor Scholarship sample 
review of DOCAs can be accessed on the ARITA website at [URL] 
                                                          
12 For example, see Paul Burges, 2012, ‘A stitch in time: early intervention in a corporate context’ Commercial 
Law Quarterly 26(3) 10. 
